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USSR Report

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

(FOUO 22/80)



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4 December 1980

USSR REPORT
POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS
(FOUO 22/80)

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INTERNATIONAL

SOVIET VIEW OF U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY DOCTRINE

Moscow DOKTRINI 'NATSIONAL'NOY BEZOPASNOSTI' V GLOBAL'NOY STRATEGII SSha
(The National Security Doctrine in U.S. Global Strategy) in Russian 1980
signed to press 20 Dec 79 pp 1-10, 355

[Annotation, table of contents, and introduction from the book by V.F. Petrovskiy,
Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, 9000 copies, 335 pages]

[Excerpts] Annotation

This book reveals the essential features of the "national security" doctrine as the ideological-theoretical platform of the monopolistic ruling clique of the United States and traces the adaptation of this doctrine to the new strategic situation in the world resulting from the growing strength of the forces of peace, socialism, and progress. The program goals of U.S. "national security" and means of achieving them (material potential, ideology, and diplomacy) are reviewed and the struggle in U.S. political circles concerning the issues of detente, primarily military detente, are discussed.

The book is intended for specialists in international affairs and teachers at higher educational institutions.

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Introduction:

The determining feature of the contemporary world situation is the turn toward alleviation of international tensions or detente.

Evaluating detente from the standpoint of the late 1970's, it is impossible not to see that detente has already gone through a certain testing in practice

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and has confirmed that it has profound roots in reality, that it is not based on factors of the moment, but rather on the true interests of states with different orders in cooperation. The principal area of such interest is reducing, and ultimately eliminating, the threat of thermonuclear disaster. Solving this problem requires unceasing joint efforts by all countries to normalize the international situation, restrict the arms race, and eliminate centers of tension. Another area of common interest is development of broad mutually advantageous cooperation in economic and scientific-technical affairs.

It is also apparent that detente has already brought about a certain beneficial change in the entire system of international relations on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence. Not only has there been a general improvement in the world political climate, but also a change has occurred in the nature of relations among states with different social orders, a change from cold war and confrontation to negotiations on a broad range of issues of mutual interest. The common interests of different states with respect to various important problems and areas of world politics have acquired a solid foundation in treaty law. Political consultation and long-term programs of economic and scientific-technical cooperation are being introduced more and more broadly in international relations. The results of detente are especially felt in Europe, which was the principal focus of bloody conflict during the world wars and endured a high degree of tension during the cold war period.

The most important result of these changes is that the danger of nuclear missile warfare has been mitigated.

While it arose from the objective needs of world development, detente at the same time became possible owing to subjective factors. The path to detente was literally "opened" by the purposeful peace-loving policy of the Soviet Union. The peace programs formulated at the highest forums of the CPSU, the 24th and 25th congresses, outlined concrete ways and means to use objective opportunities to modify international relations. A turn toward realism by Western political leaders also played a definite part.

Progress toward detente is not, however, easy. Significant and influential forces oppose the transformation of international relations to a basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence; these forces cover a broad spectrum, from the bosses of NATO to the Maoists. Their efforts are directed to preventing a further mitigation of international tension and improvement in relations between the capitalist countries and the Soviet Union. An important place among these forces belongs to the most reactionary circles in the imperialist countries, above all the United States, which is the principal guardian and protector of the world capitalist system. The vast array of various interwoven interests involved with maintaining a high level of international tension in order to protect the position of imperialism gave rise to the military-industrial complex, which brings together groups of monopolies that depend entirely on military orders, top military leaders, and a certain number of politicians, in particular in the U. S. Congress. The mouthpieces of the complex, various committees and associations, work by every means to build up a militaristic state of mind and exacerbate the international situation. The military-industrial complex is the most important permanently active factor

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which stimulates the militant-aggressive tendency in the politics of the capitalist countries and "works" stubbornly against detente.

There is also another circumstance that creates major obstacles to reordering relations between the capitalist and the socialist countries. During the period of its existence, and especially during the cold war years, American militarism has created a real ally in its own image and likeness: a large group of philosophers and sociologists who base their views on the necessity of insuring a "position of strength" for the conduct of foreign policy. A certain way of thinking has taken shape in U. S. academic literature which puts force above common sense and hinders revision of goals that have been overturned by the changed ratio of forces in the world.

The doctrine of "national security," which plays a growing role in U. S. global strategy, is a special type of political philosophy in this category.

Of course, American authors prefer to speak of a "policy" of national security, not a doctrine. But if we begin from the concepts of the doctrine that have become established in American practices as officially formulated, universal guidelines, we cannot fail to see that the ideas of national security officially set forth in the 1947 national security law have subsequently been formulated as a doctrine in the statements of virtually all American administrations, beginning with the Democratic administration of H. Truman which proclaimed it. Although they express doubt concerning the advisability of a doctrinal approach in foreign policy, nonetheless the representatives of the J. Carter administration in reality appeal to national security considerations at different levels so often that these considerations indeed sound like the working doctrine of the present administration.

At the same time, it must be kept in mind that the national security doctrine is different from those doctrines, widespread in foreign policy practice, which establish principles of U. S. behavior (actions) in international affairs (isolationism, the Monroe Doctrine, the "open door" doctrine, "freedom of the seas," and the "Truman and Nixon doctrines"). The national security doctrine deals with principles of a different type which determine the choice of means and methods of insuring the interests of U. S. ruling circles in conditions of war and peace on a global scale. For perfectly understandable class reasons, official American documents and political literature do not call these real interests and objectives by their true names, but rather clothe them in the garb of above-class, all-people's slogans. In this way, the national security doctrine rationalizes U. S. policy, which is fundamentally imperialistic, and puts it in acceptable terms of the supposed basic interests of the country.

In view of its purpose, the national security doctrine comes close to military doctrine, which contains the principles of building up and using armed forces. Overall it acts as the connecting link between foreign policy and military doctrines. The place and role of the national security doctrine are determined by the fact that it serves as an ideological-theoretical platform for the unique national security system that has been put together within the American state and is used to plan and make key governmental decisions in the fields of foreign policy and the use of the armed forces.

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Study of national security problems now plays a large part in various elements of the political and academic complex.

The conversion of the problems of national security into an independent field of academic research, which occurred soon after the end of World War II, was linked, in the first place, with the continuing militarization of U. S. foreign policy and the appearance of a qualitatively new weapon, the nuclear missile, which made reinterpretation of military force and the possibilities of its application a paramount issue, and, in the second place, the growing awareness that under the new conditions military problems could not be viewed in isolation, in a vacuum so to speak, that they would have to be coordinated with both foreign and domestic political and economic considerations.

Growth of the state national security mechanism led to a strengthening of its ties with the "academic community" and to its subordination to the interests of military business and the politics of the ruling class. Representatives of academic circles (some of whom had already been used for this purpose during World War II) were given the task of presenting studies and works on specific aspects of national security to various governmental bodies. Academics are regularly enlisted for work in the government, and many of them become full-time civil servants. At the same time the opposite processes are also occurring, where employees of government institutions go off to academic jobs. The establishment of special organizations, known as "think tanks," which are subordinate to the departments of the Air Force, Army, Navy, and Defense and carry on research in the national security field is very important. One of the most important of them is the Rand Corporation. The exchange of personnel and information led to a significant intensification of efforts by the academic community to develop topics in this field.

National security problems are the core of the research activity of the "strategic analysis" school, which engages in comprehensive development of strategic issues in foreign policy: long-term diplomatic, economic, military, and ideological actions.

Most of the studies in this subject area view national security through the prism of either a conflict that determines the policy of the country or the interaction of different states.¹ Studies in the first category usually reflect the point of view that national security is attained by maximum exertion of state power in conflict situations, in other words, the development of national security policy should be based on the premise that the state can only be secure if it is superior in power to other states or groups of states. Counterbalancing this view is the view of researchers in the second group, who emphasize the development of forms and methods of state interaction more than building up state power. This approach assumes that national security policy should be guided by the principle that state security can only be strengthened if the reliability of the entire system of international relations is strengthened.

The works of authors who believe that the goal of national security is to build up strength can be classified into three types by the subject of investigation: military, economic, and political.

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Many studies on national security issues focus attention on military problems, which reflects the view, firmly established in American writing, that national security is primarily linked to solving military problems. Despite the fact that studies in the 1960's and first half of the 1970's greatly expanded the object of investigation, taking it beyond purely military problems, issues such as strategy, tactics, weaponry, and rear planning continue to be the center of attention in many studies. Many works deal with the questions of nuclear weapons and the technology of their production (H. Kissinger, R. McNamara, H. Kahn, and J. Kahan),² working out an optimal strategy for future allout wars (H. Rowen),³ techniques of "deterrence" (B. Brodie, A. George, and R. Smoke),⁴ limited wars (R. Osgood),⁵ and the like.

Beginning in the 1960's the authors of studies on national security questions have markedly increased their interest in the material potential of the state. Attempts have been made to define and evaluate all elements that make up the "national economic potential that is essential to wage war" and to formulate economic criteria for selecting alternative systems of weapons (K. Knorr and G. Schlessinger).⁶ It is noteworthy that these approaches have found practical application at the Defense Department where strategic programs are often viewed on this plane and economists occupy positions that permit them to make important decisions. In a broader sense, both the representatives of academic circles and economists working in the government both in the United States and in other countries devote considerable attention to the problem of distribution of national resources and development of criteria to satisfy the competing demands of the military and civilian sectors of the economy.

One of the principal areas of research in the national security field is analysis of the process of making decisions that are appropriate to a developing situation. On this subject a number of works have been written on the priority of military-strategic interests over political interests in working out the political line and the role of the government and military-industrial complex in making national security decisions (S. Huntington, A. Yarmolinsky, and M. Halperin).⁷

There are only a few studies which, directly or indirectly, advance the idea that national security is dependent on strengthening interaction among states. It is very noteworthy that this interaction is chiefly limited to the bounds of the capitalist system, and for this reason the issues of integration and strengthening ties among allies are made paramount. Among the fields where interaction among states is considered desirable and possible, the studies assign a significant place to arms control in its official conception.

The study of national security problems in American writings involves broad use of the latest social science methods such as game theory, simulation theory, information theory, input/output analysis, and systems analysis. In addition, techniques borrowed from psychology, sociology, and anthropology are often used in reviewing national security problems.

The American authors studying problems of national security typically absorb the subjects they are investigating. They believe that concentrating attention primarily on national security, and not on international relations

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and foreign policy, offers greater opportunities for systematizing the growing mass of empirical data than are presented by traditional approaches. Observing that the idea of "national security" in fact arose as the result of dissatisfaction with the concept of "national interests," they see many advantages in studying international relations and foreign policy from the standpoint of national security. In the opinion of American researchers, this approach provides a convenient system of comparisons which offers a possibility of comparing events that are not outwardly comparable and promotes systematization of the vast amount of diverse comparative data obtained by means of traditional analysis of foreign policy. The orientation to national security, American authors emphasize, adds a new measure to the theory of conflict situations in traditional foreign policy and provides an opportunity for comprehensive analysis of general international problems. Finally, analysis done from the standpoint of national security presupposes the establishment of an interrelationship between domestic and foreign policy actions by states and begins from the notion that the behavior of a state in the world arena can only be understood in the context of the national security policy it follows. Thus this analysis makes it possible to consider foreign and domestic policy together, as an instrument for defending the same values and, ultimately, maintaining the national and international systems that suit the ruling classes in the West.

Critical notes are also beginning to be heard lately in the vast stream of literature on national security problems. Among the representatives of what is called the "neorevisionist" school, the views of the prominent American political scientist H. Laswell are widespread today. He believes that with the establishment of the national security system there appeared a "garrison state" in which "policy is managed by specialists in the use of force."⁸

The broad use of the principles of the national security doctrine in practical politics and the considerable volume of primarily apologetic literature in the United States on this subject make it urgently necessary to have a critical analysis of this doctrine, to reveal the true purpose concealed behind its outward conceptual pluralism — the power approach to international affairs, and to determine realistic ways to resolve such a truly important problem as national security in the present day.

FOOTNOTES

1. American authors discern the source of the concept of "national security" in the theory of "national interest." The first definition of national security in the categories of national interest was given by the American journalist and sociologist W. Lippmann. "The nation is in a state of security," Lippmann wrote, "when it is not forced to sacrifice its lawful interests to avoid war and when it can defend these interests, if necessary, by war" (W. Lippmann, "U. S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic," Boston, 1943, p 5).

As American political scientist A. Wolfers recognizes, however, even with the standard acknowledgement that states must have such interests, the simple conversion of "national interest" into "national security interests" did not lead to any satisfactory solution to the problem of defining "national security" (see A. Wolfers, "National Security as an

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Ambiguous Symbol," POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, 1952, Vol 62, pp 481-502". Different viewpoints on the question of the interrelationship of the categories of "national interest" and "national security" are quite broadly represented in the 1976 collection of works entitled, "U. S. Foreign Policy: Principles for Defining National Interest" (New York, 1976).

New attempts to define this concept appeared with the spread of behaviorism and systems analysis in American writing. In the work of American sociologist M. Kaplan "System and Process in International Politics" (New York, 1957), national interests and the interests of national security are considered as just one, although important, aspect of the problem of maintaining the international system.

It is typical that all these attempts to define national security take a non-class approach to the object of study and ignore the decisive importance of the socioeconomic essence of this phenomenon.

2. See H. Kissinger, "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy," New York, 1975; R. McNamara, "The Essence of Security. Reflections in Office," New York, 1968; H. H. Kahn, "On Thermonuclear War," Princeton, 1960; J. Kahan, "Security in the Nuclear Age. Developing U. S. Strategic Arms Policy," Washington, 1975.
3. See H. Rowen, "National Security and the American Economy in the 1960's," U. S. Congress Joint Economic Committee, Study Paper No 18, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, 1968.
4. Brodie, B., "Strategy in the Missile Age," Princeton, 1959; A. George and R. Smoke, "Deterrence in American Foreign Policy. Theory and Practice," New York, 1974.
5. See R. Osgood, "Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy," Chicago, 1957.
6. See K. Knorr, "Military Power and Potential," Lexington, 1970; G. Schlessinger, "The Political Economy of National Security. A Study of the Economic Aspects of the Contemporary Power Struggle," New York, 1960.
7. Huntington, S., "The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics," New York, 1966; A. Yarmolinsky, "The Military Establishment. Its Impact on American Society," New York, 1971; M. Halperin, "National Security Policy-Making: Analyses, Cases and Proposals," Lexington, 1975.
8. Laswell, H., "The Garrison State Hypothesis Today — Changing Patterns of Military Politics," New York, 1962.

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INTERNATIONAL

BOOK ON U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY DOCTRINE

Moscow DOKTRINA 'NATSIONAL'NOY BEZOPASNOSTI' V GLOBAL'NOY STRATEGII SShA in Russian 1980 signed to press 20 Dec 79 pp 1-2, 336-37

[Table of contents and brief description of book by V.F. Petrovskiy]

[Excerpts] Title Page:

Title: DOKTRINA 'NATSIONAL'NOY BEZOPASNOSTI' V GLOBAL'NOY STRATEGII SShA (The Doctrine of "National Security" in U.S. Global Strategy)

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Brief description:

This book discloses the essence of the doctrine of "national security" as the ideological-theoretical platform of the U.S. monopolistic leaders. It traces the adaptation of this doctrine to the new strategic world setting caused by the growing strength of the forces of peace, socialism and progress. The aims of U.S. "national security" and the means of achieving them (material potential, ideology, diplomacy) are examined. The struggle in U.S. political circles concerning questions of detente, primarily in the military sphere, is described. The book is intended for international specialists and VUZ instructors.

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JUDAISM SAID TO SLIGHT WOMEN'S RIGHTS

Kiev LYUDYNA I SVIT in Ukrainian No 7, Jul 80 pp 41-45

[Article by R. Brenman, candidate of philosophical sciences: "Judaic Morality. Whom Does It Serve?"]

[Excerpts] Judaism and the Female

Judaic morality treats women in a negative way, not recognizing their equality with men. The Talmud demands from its believers a daily morning prayer: "Let you be praised, God, our sovereign, for not creating me as a woman."

Judaism since time immemorial has sanctified the unequal standing of the woman in society. This biblical narrative about God's creation of man is imbued with this idea on woman's inequality.

In the East, where the Talmudic laws were formed, rabbis proclaimed the time of marriage for girls as the moment of arriving at an early sexual maturity (near age 12); it was the father's right to give his daughter in marriage to anyone he pleased, regardless of the daughter's consent and long before the period of sexual maturity. Young men were allowed to establish a family when they were between the ages of 13 and 20. The rabbis declared that 18 years old was the ideal age for marriage. If a man had not married by the time he was 20, a spiritual court had the right to force him to marry.

Having developed a religious-ethical code, the rabbis demanded that Jews strictly adhere to its statutes.

Even today the rabbis in every way possible encourage the practice of early marriages. This is particularly graphically traced to the clerical-Zionist powers in Israel. Official statistics attest that most young girls in Israel get married before age 17 and young men by age 23. After age 20 for women and 23 for men, the number of marriages sharply decreases.

Early marriages are accompanied by many children. Modern rabbis are convinced that having many children is the best demonstration of the rightness of man's life on earth at the time of final judgment in God's court.

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At the insistence of clerical parties, which are ruling in Israel, only religious marriages are recognized. Mixed marriages are practically impossible. Many of those in love, who want to get married but who confess to different religions if they have different nationalities, are forced to leave the country in order to carry out their marriage somewhere abroad (for example, on the island of Cyprus). A child born to a non-Jewish male and a Jewish female is recognized as a Jew; but if born to a Jewish male and a non-Jewish female the child is not recognized as having equal rights in religious aspects. The struggle of democratic forces to introduce civil marriages has not been successful to this time.

Even in Judiac rituals the woman's inequality with the male is underlined. Women are forbidden to participate in synagogue prayer ceremonies together with men; they are segregated into a separate, smaller area. They are able to pray either somewhere on the synagogue balcony or in its most remote corner. At the time of divine service to mention the name of a woman or even to think about her image is strictly forbidden. Conversing with a woman outside of the walls of the allotted space is disgraceful for the rabbi. If 10 men gather together, then a service can be conducted, but women, even if they gather in much greater numbers, do not enjoy this right.

These rules are obligatory for any Judiac community in the world. As for Israel, they are based on traditional Judaic dogmatism and are supported in every way by the state authorities.

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NATIONAL

UZBEKS NOT EXPECTED TO MIGRATE TO CITIES

Moscow SOVETSKAYA ETNOGRAFIYA in Russian No 4, 1980 pp 105-113

[Article by A. I. Ginzburg, "On the Influence of Several National Traditions on Migration from Village to City (based on material from the Moldavian and Uzbek SSRs)"]

[Text] The process of urbanization, actively developing in our country, is one of the most complicated of social processes. A very important quantitative indicator of this is the growth of the relative proportion of urban population in all populations of the country, which is occurring as a result of natural, mechanical growth as well as the administrative reorganization of rural population points into urban, and also by virtue of migration from the village to the city, drawing all of the new strata of the rural population into the stream of urban life.

The period between the censuses of 1970 and 1979, the urban population of the USSR grew from 56 to 62 percent. The number of urban residents increased by 27 million, and rural residents decreased by 6.9 million. Therefore, it is quite natural that interest in the problems of migration and in particular migration from village to city has noticeably increased in recent times.

In the study of the urbanization process, different aspects present themselves: economic, social, ethnographic and others. Before the researchers stand the tasks of studying not only the fact of mechanical shift (migration) itself, but also the processes of settling of migrants in conditions that are new to them, and adaptation¹ to city life.

Usually the problem of adaptation is examined in combination with other questions connected with the study of migration processes.² Rural migration to cities is being researched most completely by Siberian scholars. These scholars are fundamentally and comprehensively examining migration in connection with labor problems in Siberia.³

Another aspect of research contemplates the study of the influence of the city on the migrant, on the change in his values, goals, and psychology. Few studies have been done in this area, despite the interest shown in it by the majority of scientists studying questions of migration.

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The intensity of migration from the village to the city varies in different parts of the country. In 1970, least was from the villages in Central Asia (average five persons per thousand per year), and also in Moldavia and the Transcaucasus (less than 10 persons per thousand).⁴

Rural migration to the cities does not correspond, in all parts of the country, to the need for workers in the city. In connection with this, the relocation of rural migrants to the city, and their social and psychological adaptation to new conditions acquires great importance.

There is a great difference between migrants who are partly and fully adapted to the city. In the former group, a change in consciousness, behavior, and orientation may not take place; in the latter group, they take place of necessity. Consequently, if acclimatization can conditionally bring about the first stage of assimilation of the migrant to the city, then adaptation is the second stage, a qualitatively new condition of the migrants. The transition of the migrant from the first stage to the second depends both on objective circumstances connected with his level of education, specialty, knowledge of city life, and on his psychological characteristics, as well as on the circumstances of departure and circumstance of his arrival in the city.

On arrival in the city, the migrant encounters a range of psychological problems, the overcoming of which depends mostly on his adaptive capabilities. The prominent American social psychologist, G. Shibutani, evaluating the significance of psychological moments in social life, writes: "Each personality is characterized by an individual combination of devices which allow him to cope with difficulties, and these devices can be seen as forms of adaptation. In contrast to the concept of 'accommodation,' which relates to the way an organism accommodates itself to the demands of specific situations, adaptation applies to more stable solutions--a well organized means of coping with typical problems, to devices crystallized by means of a successive series of accommodations."⁵ The necessity of adaptation to new situations keeps the personality in a state of internal mobilization. Until this condition exists, the migrant feels uncomfortable in the new surroundings. Reorientation and the ability to adapt to new urban conditions depend on a multiplicity of factors. In the present article, we will dwell on several questions connected with the influence of specific national characteristics of morals and manners on migration to the city and on adaptation to it by former rural residents of the native populations⁶ in Moldavia and Uzbekistan; we will also examine the influence of the level of education, social-professional affiliation of the migrants, and their knowledge of the Russian language on migrational activity and adaptation of migrants in the city. Statistical information and some materials on ethnosociological research which were conducted from 1972 through 1976 by the section on social-specific research of the Institute of Ethnography of the USSR Academy of Sciences on the topic "Optimization of Social-Cultural Conditions of Development and Rapprochement of Nations in the USSR"⁷ which examined information obtained about migrants, served as sources for the present work.

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In both republics, work was conducted in various types of cities. In Moldavia, research was done in Kishinev, capital of the republic, with a population of more than 300,000 people, in comparison with the large cities of Beltsakh and Tiraspol, the medium cities of Kargal and Saronakh, and the "small" cities of Faleshti and Kalarash. In all, 1984 Moldavians from the cities of the republic were interviewed, of whom, as it turned out, 44.9 percent were migrants from the village.

In Uzbekistan, research was carried out in the capital of the republic, Tashkent, comprising 1.5 million residents; in the large cities of Samarkand and Andizhan; in the medium cities of Angren and Almalyk; and in the "small" city of Katakurgan. In the cities of Uzbekistan 1,271 Uzbeks were interviewed, 13.9 percent of whom were rural migrants.

Interest in the study of the characteristics of migrational activity and adaptation of rural residents in Moldavia and Uzbekistan arose primarily because, in these republics, the rural population far exceeds the median index for the Soviet Union; therefore, if the total rural population of the USSR comprised 38 percent of the total population in 1979, in Uzbekistan it was 59 percent, and in Moldavia 62 percent. But, in spite of the fact that the proportions of rural population in Moldavia and Uzbekistan are almost identical, the rate of growth of their urban population relative to native ethnic nationalities is different. Thus, in Moldavia, for the period 1959 through 1979, the proportion of rural population decreased by 17 percent, and in Uzbekistan by 7 percent (see Table 1)

Statistics and ethnographic research for the last decade form a basis for suggesting that, in the near future, migrational activity by the rural population in Moldavia will increase, and in Uzbekistan, apparently, significant changes are not anticipated.

The indicators of migration differ most of all in the capitals of these republics. Thus, if in Kishinev (the population of which was 356,000 according to the 1970 census of the USSR), for 2 years prior to the census, 4.3 percent of the overall population of the city came from the villages of Moldavia, then in Tashkent, with a population of 1,384,503, 1 percent of the overall population⁸ came from the villages of Uzbekistan over the same period.

In Uzbekistan the majority of rural residents, interviewed by us, were quite satisfied with living conditions in the village, and only 5 percent intended to move to the city. Such a low orientation towards mobility is conditioned historically by established native traditions. Overwhelming majority of the Uzbek population traditionally is engaged in agriculture. Cotton production--its primary branch--until recently required a great number of manual workers. Scientific-technical progress, mechanization, and automation of many agricultural processes has significantly curtailed the demand for manual labor. Customary living standards of the rural population, however, have remained stable. It has been extraordinarily difficult for the Uzbek rural population to overcome the psychological barrier connected with native traditions; firstly, with strong ties to family and neighbors, with the large number of

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children in Uzbek families, and early marriages. Of considerable significance is and was an insufficient command of the Russian language--the language of inter-ethnic intercourse, a knowledge which is necessary in the urban setting.

In Moldavia, several different conditions occur. There, seasonal work has long been prevalent: the head of the family, and often the older children as well, go to the city to earn a living. Individual families of such workers have with time moved to the city. These workers have brought to the rural setting those urban standards which determined their life in the city. Moldavians, as a rule, have not been bound by association with people of their own nationality. Russians, Ukrainians, Jews, and others took up residence in the villages side by side with them, and made it possible for them to become accustomed to a multi-ethnic setting. Thus, the redistribution of rural and urban populations is to some degree conditioned by traditionally established conditions.

For different categories of rural residents unequal migrational activity is characteristic. Unequal also are the reasons which attract them to the city in Moldavia and Uzbekistan. Most active in migration are youth, who are attracted to the city above all by the opportunity of obtaining a middle-specialty or higher education. What concerns social-professional groups is that migration is highest among upper-level executives and specialists with a higher education, for whom the city is attractive primarily as a cultural center. From among the number of specialists with a middle agricultural education, usually only those who intend to obtain a higher education leave for the city. The desire to move to the city is not great among the remaining categories of rural residents. Consequently, potential migrants are most often youth with a comparatively high educational level, for whom there are not always possibilities to continue education or obtain a desired specialty in the village.

Adaptation to urban conditions to a significant measure is made possible by the education professional orientation, and psychological preparedness of the migrant. Knowledge of the Russian language plays a particularly large role, since the cities of Moldavia and Uzbekistan are multi-ethnic. In Tashkent, for example, in 1970, Uzbeks comprised 37.1 percent of the population, Russians 40.8 percent, Tatars 7.1 percent, Koreans 1.4 percent, Armenians 1.0 percent, Takzhiks 0.6 percent, and so on. In Kishinev, in the same year, Moldavians comprised 37.2 percent of the population, Russians 30.7 percent, Ukrainians 14.2 percent, Bulgarians 1.1 percent, Belorussians 0.7 percent, Gagauzes 0.7 percent, and so on. Essentially, Russian is the common means of communication for the residents of Tashkent and Kishinev.⁹

The ethnic composition of migrants is close to the ethnic structure of the cities, and this is natural: the more widely distributed one or another nationality is within a city, the more easily a migrant of the given nationality adapts to it. The transition of future migrants to the city is made easier if they can find a familiar linguistic setting, count on the help of their relatives in working and living situations and, finally, simply for psychological support in resolving various day-to-day questions, and so forth.

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In 1970, in Moldavia, the majority of urban residents of an ethnic population--62.5 percent--had a command of the Russian Language; while at the same time, among the Uzbeks, the proportion having a command of Russian was two times smaller.¹⁰

The linguistic situation in Moldavia and Uzbekistan is different. In Moldavia, indigenous rural residents have dealings primarily with Russians and Ukrainians, and therefore have to some degree a command of Russian or Ukrainian. In Uzbekistan many Uzbek villagers live near settlements of other Central Asian nationalities, and Uzbeks usually know those languages which they use with neighboring settlements, in addition to their own. In the villages of Moldavia, 27.5 percent of the Moldavians have Russian as a second language, but in Uzbekistan, a corresponding 7.2 percent of the Uzbeks. Naturally, arriving in an urban setting, Moldavians adapt to it more quickly. Uzbeks usually learn Russian in school, rarely at home. For this reason the level of qualification of Russian language teachers, especially in the ethnic schools of Uzbekistan, and the supply of necessary textbooks to schools are so important.

According to ethnosociological research data, during the first year at work in the city, 45.6 percent of migrants in Moldavia speak most often in Moldavian, 15.3 percent in Russian, and 29.3 percent in both languages; having lived in the city 5 years or more, they already use Russian more often--27.5 percent, and 36.1 percent use both languages. Command of Russian makes it possible for the migrants to contact representatives of other nationalities both at work and in school.

Insufficient knowledge of the Russian language among the Uzbeki rural population makes setting in the urban setting difficult. Only in the case of migration to a city with insignificant numbers of other ethnic groups do language problems not arise for the rural residents. Usually, these are old, so-called small cities. Rural migrants acclimate more easily in such cities where, besides favorable linguistic situation, there exist still other attractive features for the migrant, namely the life style is closer to the rural.

On the other hand, there remains for migrants the situation of cities with a primarily multi-ethnic composition. Thus, in the city of Taraspol, according to the 1970 census, Moldavians comprised only 15.4 percent of the population; a similar situation existed in the Uzbek city of Angren (20 percent Uzbek). The influence of native traditions in such cities is weakened.

The new environment forces migrants to change some norms of behavior and values in accordance with those which exist in a given urban environment. This occurs actively especially in the capitals of republics.

Adaptation to the urban form of life is dependent on many circumstances, in particular the character of production. Much depends on the migrants themselves; their "preparedness" for conditions of urban life, the level of

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their education (if they wish to continue study), professional preparation, (if they intend to begin work immediately), and, apparently, on certain individual psychological characteristics, among them the ability to adapt, easily or with difficulty, to new surroundings. It has been observed that if only the production sphere of activity changes, and not the whole mode of life, then adaptation proceeds quickly and almost painlessly.

Adaptation of a migrant to a large or small enterprise, or to large, medium, or small cities, occurs differently. The more limited enter an ethnically homogeneous collective, characteristic of enterprises in small cities; as a rule, rural residents newly arrived in the city, seek work in a familiar ethnic setting. However, a small city rarely has educational institutions, and youth, seeking to continue their education, migrate to medium and especially to large cities, despite the known difficulties of adaptation which await them. Migration processes, in spite of the continuous increase in the standard of living for rural residents, increasingly captures their attention. Rural residents of long-term developing areas are usually attracted to the city not by the desire to increase their material well-being, (there is often more chance of this in the villages), but namely by the urban life style. Rural migrants, including Moldavians and Uzbeks, are attracted to the city by opportunities not available in the villages.

In the group of migrants, who have lived in the city up to 5 years, young people from 18-24 years of age comprise an absolute majority. It is mostly migrants in the age group of 25-49 years who have lived in the city for more than 5 years. According to correlation of sexes both these age groups are almost equal, according to level of education they differ noticeably. In Uzbekistan, migrants of the below-24 age group (61.4 percent) predominate, among them mostly persons up to 18 years old, students in professional-technical schools, technical schools, or VUZ's, and also children who came with their parents. In the first years of life in the city, migrants value most of all their cultural setting. More than 70 percent of Moldavian and 46.2 percent of Uzbeki former rural residents indicated this during an interview. With the passage of time, questions, of lifestyle, material welfare, and wages assume greater significance. Broader choices of career for children are also valued.

In administering ethnosociological questionnaires in Uzbekistan, migrants were asked where they worked after their move to the city. Thirty-seven percent of those questioned were engaged in manual labor, and only 5.9 percent were specialists with higher or middle qualifications. Thirty-six percent began to study immediately in specialized schools after arriving.

Social change occurring in Moldavia and Uzbekistan are reflected in all aspects of life of the population including education level of the former rural residents. Educational level and age are interdependent. Intergenerational differences in educational level are graphically seen in the material from ethnosociological research. (see Table 2).

Persons with middle specialized and higher education make up 44.9 percent of the Moldavian migrants and 38.0 percent of the Uzbek migrants; as a rule, they received it in the city. Parents of the migrants having an education comprise about 3 percent in all. The semiliterate among parents of Moldavian and Uzbeki migrants number about 60 percent.

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The professional standing of migrating rural residents also changed. Among those Moldavians and Uzbeks who moved to the cities in the mid-1960's, not less than 50 percent began their careers with unskilled labor. The majority of the migrants of the 70's began to work after receiving a middle or higher specialized education. Under present conditions, the Moldavian and Uzbeki people are rapidly changing their social make-up. These changes are quite clearly reflected in each age group, which finds confirmation in the social status of the group of migrants examined.

Social mobility of contemporary migrants, in comparison with their parents, is also proceeding significantly more rapidly. (see Table 3).

An analysis of the data shows quite clearly that with an increase in educational level of the migrants (in comparison with parents), their social-professional growth results.

Complex and interesting types of activity which occupy migrants more often create in them a feeling of satisfaction with their work. In its turn, satisfaction with work is one of the most important conditions of successful adaptation of migrants in the city. Answering the question as to what was important for them to feel happy, over 70 percent put interesting work in first place. Dissatisfaction with work is one of the indicators of an uncomfortable personal situation. The majority of migrants are satisfied with their work and do not intend to change it, it had satisfied their expectations. The migrants' satisfaction with work is connected to their feeling of participation in the life of the collective. The migrant's happiness with the social life of the collective often indicates his level of adaptation to new working conditions, and the coincidence of his self-estimation with the estimation of his social and working collective. In the first years of life in the city and, correspondingly, the first years work, the migrant does not find his place in the working collective immediately. Gradually adapting to production, he takes an increasingly active part in social life. The rate of professional adaptation, as a rule, is connected with the social activity of the migrant.

A comparative analysis of the data on groups of Moldavian migrants living in the city for up to and more than 5 years showed that the latter group had 22 percent more participation in social life of the collective (55 versus 33 percent) and almost 20 percent satisfied workers. An analogous situation can be seen among Uzbek migrants.

The course of adaptation, when favorably influenced by the coincidence of the migrants' social and professional orientation with their actual work, creates work satisfaction.

The labor activity of migrants in the city in many cases depends on their professional orientation, already established before leaving for the city, and depends on many factors, among them traditional attitudes towards different types of activity, and professional prestige.

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Moldavian and Uzbeki rural migrants in turn are drawn essentially into urban professions. However, in each republic there are the more preferred, of course, their admission changes with time. Thus, if in the '60s in Moldavia, 10.9 percent of all rural arrivals were employed in service enterprises, at the time of inquiry (1972), only 4.2 percent remained there. In Uzbekistan, 77.8 percent of the migrants working in service occupations had been there 10 years or more, and only 16.7 percent less than 5 years. In recent times, the migrants' choice of professions has become broader. Former rural residents work in all sectors of the national economy, the same as native urban residents. That in the city there are no restrictions on the migrant's choice of work, and that he feels quite adequate in his expectations, facilitates his adaptation to his new surroundings. Adaptation to new working conditions, as a rule, takes place easily, which testifies to the equal opportunities for and claims of both recently arrived migrants and long time city dwellers.

In a multi-ethnic city, migrants deal with people of various nationalities, but their friends are most often found among young people of up to 25 years (in Uzbekistan 70 percent, in Moldavia 71.2 percent). Young people quickly are included in the life of the cities, and adopt those orientations towards cultural activities which are characteristic of the given setting.

All migrants, irrespective of age, maintain contact with their home villages, where they still have close relatives and friends for a long time. Not only ties of family and friendship, but the whole former rural lifestyle and familiar surroundings still attract both Uzbekis and Moldavians back to the village. Therefore, during the initial period, they often return to visit the village: more than half of them more than once a month. Having lived in the city more than 5 years, and become used to the urban lifestyle, adapted to new conditions, found new friends and comrades, they visit the village more rarely (only 33.8 percent of the Moldavian migrants still visit once a month or more). But even after more than 5 years of life in the city, ties with the village are not finally broken: about half visit their homes several times a year.

Migrants, regardless of time lived in the city, still value the rural life highly. About 24 percent of Moldavians living up to 5 years in the city remarked that material conditions were better in the village; many of the migrants find that life in the country is calmer. Nonetheless a majority of the migrants do not wish to leave the city for the village. Thus, in Uzbekistan, 70.2 percent of the migrants consider urban life preferable to the rural.

The most precise indicator of adaptation to new urban conditions is the reluctance of migrants to return to the village. In Moldavia 82.2 percent and in Uzbekistan 78.9 percent do not intend to return to their birthplaces. An increase in migrants' educational level and becoming accustomed to the urban lifestyle promote, to some degree, the desire to remain permanently in the city.

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Table 1

Proportion of rural population within the overall population of the republics of Uzbekistan and Moldavia, in percent. *

| REGION | YEAR | | | |
|-----------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| | <u>1940</u> | <u>1959</u> | <u>1970</u> | <u>1979</u> |
| Uzbek SSR | 75 | 66 | 63 | 59 |
| Moldavian SSR | 87 | 78 | 68 | 61 |
| Total for the country | 67 | 52 | 44 | 38 |

*Compiled from: "National economy of the USSR", M., 1977, p 44; "Population of the USSR according to data of the All-Union census of the population, 1979", M., 1980, pp 4, 8-11.

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Table 2
Level of education of rural migrants and their parents, percentage of those questioned.

| <u>Level of Education</u> | <u>Moldavians</u> | | | <u>Uzbeks</u> | | |
|--------------------------------|---|----------------|----------------|---|----------------|----------------|
| | <u>Migrants, at time of inquiry</u> | <u>Fathers</u> | <u>Mothers</u> | <u>Migrants, at time of inquiry</u> | <u>Fathers</u> | <u>Mothers</u> |
| Less than 4 years | 10.2 | 53.5 | 71.5 | 20.4 | 53.2 | 63.2 |
| 4-6 years | 4.8 | 16.1 | 9.2 | 4.7 | 7.0 | 9.4 |
| 7-9 years | 19.2 | 12.5 | 6.4 | 14.6 | 11.1 | 8.8 |
| Terminal middle | 19.5 | 3.7 | 2.6 | 20.51 | 9.4 | 5.8 |
| Special middle | 12.4 | 2.8 | 2.2 | 8.8 | 3.5 | 1.8 |
| Continuing higher or higher | 32.5 | 2.1 | 0.8 | 29.2 | 8.2 | 3.5 |
| Did not respond | 1.4 | 9.3 | 7.3 | 1.8 | 7.6 | 7.5 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

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Table 3

Social-professional position of rural migrants and their parents, percent of those questioned.

| Social-professional Group | <u>Moldavians</u> | | | <u>Uzbeks</u> | | |
|--|------------------------------|---------|---------|------------------------------|---------|---------|
| | Migrants, at time of inquiry | Fathers | Mothers | Migrants, at time of inquiry | Fathers | Mothers |
| Unskilled or semi-skilled manual labor | 15.3 | 61.5 | 78.9 | 39.2 | 63.7 | 78.9 |
| Skilled manual labor | 26.7 | 6.5 | 1.2 | 21.6 | 5.8 | 1.2 |
| White-collar workers | 4.6 | 2.3 | 1.1 | 1.8 | 2.9 | 2.3 |
| Middle-level specialists | 9.4 | 6.1 | 2.2 | 5.3 | 2.9 | 4.1 |
| Higher-level specialists | 33.8 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 28.1 | 5.8 | 2.3 |
| Middle executives | 2.3 | 3.1 | 0.8 | 3.5 | 2.3 | 0.0 |
| Senior executives | 0.8 | 0.9 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 3.5 | 0.0 |
| Did not respond | 7.1 | 18.7 | 14.5 | 0.5 | 13.1 | 11.2 |

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Questions of the replenishment of urban populations and problems of the acclimatization of their rural migrants are still insufficiently studied, especially in terms of social-psychological adaptation. Working out these problems, the examination of conditions conducive to successfully overcoming the period of adaptation, and the mastery of norms of behavior which are new to the migrant, are possible only when the condition of tension of internal mobilization is removed.

Inasmuch as we are proceeding from the fact that the rate of migration is determined by various objective and subjective factors, we will outline the most significant of them. First, there are the historically established social and ethno-demographic characteristics of the population and the characteristics of its distribution in various regions of the country. The second is chiefly psychological conditions and orientations. On the whole, interdependent objective and subjective factors determine the specific particularities of different ethnic groups of migrants influencing their migrational activity, in this case Moldavians and Uzbeks.

Everyday ethnic traditions of the migrants and their social characteristics, inherent in a people at the present time, for example, level of education, degree of urbanization, professional orientation and so forth, exert influence on the length of time necessary for adaptation to the urban setting. To clarify the roles of objective and subjective factors in migrational processes and in the adaptation of migrants to the city, more concrete comparative research is necessary.

The clarification of the mechanics of migration and conditions conducive to the optimization of these processes is actual.

In this article, only certain questions have been raised. Their further elaboration will permit the general laws of migrational movements, the adaptation of rural residents to the city, and their specific national and regional peculiarities to be brought out.

FOOTNOTES

1. By adaptation we mean the process of becoming accustomed to a new setting, accompanied by a reconstruction of all systems of value conditions and orientations.
2. "Social Researches". M., 1969; V. G. Venzher. Social-economic problems of the industrialization of agricultural production. "Questions of Economics", 1971; V. I. Staroverov. City and Countryside. M., 1972; O.V. Larmin. Methodological problems in the Study of Ethnic Populations. M., 1974; A. G. Antipov. Influence of means of Mass Information on the Professional Orientation of Youth. "Sociological Problems of Public Opinion and Mass Information", M., 1975; V. I. Perevedentsev. Methods of studying the migration of populations. M., 1975; V. I. Staroverov. Social-demographic problems of the countryside. M., 1975; G. A. Slesarev. Demographic processes and the social structure of Socialist society. M., 1978.

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3. Zh. A. Zayonchovskaya, V. I. Perevedentsev. Contemporary migration of the population of the Krasnodar kray. Novosibirsk, 1964. Zh. A. Zayonchovskaya. New homes in the cities. M., 1972; D. L. Konstantinovskiy. Regional and national peculiarities of the professional orientation of the youth of Siberia. "Izd. of the Siberian section of the USSR Academy of Sciences", I, 1975; "The contemporary Siberian countryside". Novosibirsk, 1975.
4. V. I. Perevedentsev. Methods of studying the migration of populations. M., 1975, pp 23, 64.
5. G. Shibutani, Social Psychology. M., 1969, p 78
6. By ethnic population we mean the nationality after which the republic is named.
7. See: Yu. V. Arutyunyan. Social-cultural aspects of the development and convergence of nationalities in the USSR. "Sov. Etnografiya," 1972, No 3; Yu. B. Arutyunyan, V. S. Kondrat'ev. On the conduct of research in Moldavia "Optimization of social-cultural conditions of the development and rapprochement of nations in the USSR"--"Results of field research by the Institute of Ethnography in 1971", M., 1972.
8. "National Economy of the USSR" M., 1977, p 44
9. Results of the All-Union census of the population, 1970", M., 1973, Vol. VII, pp 218, 279.
10. Ibid., pp 207, 278.

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